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More On Wasted Reconstruction Projects In Iraq

It’s been reported here many times before that one of the greatest signs of failure of the United States’ effort to rebuild Iraq was the number of large reconstruction projects that the Iraqis have not been able to maintain after they were handed over to them.

Iraq’s Budget Problems Will Continue Into Next Year

Iraq’s cabinet has passed a new preliminary 2010 budget. It stands at $67.29 billion, an $8.4 billion increase from 2009. Like previous budgets, the overwhelming majority of the spending will go towards operational costs. Of the $67 billion, 73%, $49.17 billion will be for salaries, pensions, etc. That leaves only $17.83 billion for the capital budget that goes towards development and infrastructure.

U.S. Forces Restricted To Rural Areas and Reconstruction

After the June 30, 2009 deadline to withdraw from Iraq’s cities, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki set stringent restrictions upon the movement of U.S. troops. This caught U.S. commanders by surprise as they expected to largely continue on with their patrols, training missions, supply convoys, etc. as they had before.

Too Many Costs and Corruption To Develop Iraqi Economy

While on a trip to Ninewa province, Planning Minister Ali Baban said that the government had too many costs and too much corruption to develop the economy. The Minister noted that of the $58.6 billion in the 2009 budget, 80% went to operational costs such as salaries, pensions, and the food ration system, leaving only 20% for investment in infrastructure and development. He said that wasn’t near enough to finance the amount of projects Iraq needed.

Iraq's Provinces Still Having Budget Problems

Iraq's eighteen provinces are still struggling with their finances this year. In 2008 when the price of Iraqi crude was soaring, Iraq's budget increased with it. Iraq's governorates signed dozens of new development projects as a result. Few of those were finished however, so the bills rolled over into the new fiscal year. That coincided with a collapse in world oil prices with the recession. That means the new provincial councils elected in January 2009 are now faced with the outstanding obligations of their predecessors, leaving little to no funds for their own plans.

Could The U.S. Have Done Better In Iraq?

In the October 2008 issue of the journal Security Studies, Daniel Byman of Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution, asked the question could the U.S. have done better with post-war Iraq? The article was entitled, “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. didn’t have enough international support going into the war, didn’t commit enough troops, didn’t expect an insurgency, and then made bad policy choices like disbanding the Iraqi army.

Iraqis Unwilling To Accept Projects Big And Small From the U.S.

Iraq has been the largest reconstruction project ever attempted by the United Sates. When the Coalition Provisional Authority took over administration of Iraq in April 2003 it was focused upon completely transforming the country through large, multi-million dollar reconstruction projects. Many of these were started without regard to security, cost, oversight, or the needs of Iraqis.

Oil Revenues Up, But Too Late For Iraq’s Provinces

In June 2009 Iraq had the highest oil revenues of the year, yet that has not helped Iraq’s provinces, which are facing massive budget deficits. That’s because it took five months for the country to reach the petroleum price set in the 2009 budget, and oil exports have still not achieved their target. 2008 was also a boom year for Iraq’s oil industry, and the provinces made large commitments to development projects as a result. Now that’s all coming back to haunt them.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams To End By 2011?

One of the positive changes made during the Surge was to dramatically increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. Early attempts at reconstruction in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were characterized by huge, multi-million dollar projects without regard to security, cost, or the needs of Iraqis. The PRTs tried to reverse these trends by focusing upon small-scale projects that were coordinated with local Iraqis and government officials.

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